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Judicial Review Judgment (NSW Supreme Court): 12 Grounds Reframed as one Question Not Ventilated.

  • 11 minutes ago
  • 3 min read
Judicial Review Judgment of Acting Justice Griffiths in Odtojan and Bryl v Law Society of NSW and its council.

Justice delayed, obscured, or selectively applied is justice denied.


This short video shows how 12 grounds in our judicial review proceedings were conceptualised into a single question in the judgment of Acting Justice Griffiths of the NSW Supreme Court (a similar approach appears in Mr Bryl’s judgment).


That question does not reflect any of our pleaded grounds. It was never raised by either party, never argued, and never ventilated. Yet, it appears as the central framing of the judgment.


Where are the 12 grounds? A reader must move through more than 20 pages before the judgment turns to them, and even then, they are not clearly identified or substantively engaged.


As raised previously, concerns existed about whether we would receive a fair hearing, given the broader history of this matter, including disputed narratives, alleged false records, and omissions of evidence arising from the leave to appeal judgments of Supreme Court of NSW Justices Leeming and Kirk, and Basten and White, who referred two acknowledged witnesses to the Legal Services Commissioner.


What was the outcome of those referrals concerning alleged conduct issues? There was no independent determination. The issues later became framed as “non-disclosure” concerns, despite express statements that there was no breach of disclosure obligations under Rule 13 of the Uniform General Rules.


For nearly a year, repeated misconduct allegations were raised against us without particularisation, without independent NCAT determination under Chapter 5 of the Uniform Law, and without a proper opportunity to be heard.


During that time, actions were taken affecting our professional standing and practising rights without a clearly articulated lawful process.


We requested that the Judge provide the transcript of proceedings relied upon. None was provided. 


Material arguments and key statutory provisions under the Uniform Law, including section 262 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law which was squarely put to the Court, were not addressed in the judgment.


Judicial review is designed as a legality review. It is not a merits review. Yet, this judgment largely reproduces the Law Society’s reasoning and background narrative over approximately 20 pages, (the Law Society's decision is about 24 pages) while the statutory and jurisdictional bridge between allegation and conclusion of unfitness is not clearly articulated.


This raises serious concerns. If Chapter 5 conduct processes, with their safeguards, reporting obligations, proportionality requirements, and independent tribunal oversight, can effectively be bypassed through Chapter 3 discretion, then the protective architecture intended by Parliament is significantly undermined. 



The judgment proceeds on the basis that in making renewal decisions under Chapter 3 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law, the Law Society has 'discretion' whether or not to invoke the disciplinary process in Chapter 5, notwithstanding that the matters relied upon consist of serious conduct allegations, "alleged prior misconduct", "misconduct," including alleged breaches of Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 5 and 32 arising from Supreme Court referrals. The reasoning does not explain how such conduct-based allegations may be relied upon to determine unfitness without engagement of the disciplinary framework contemplated by s 262 of the Uniform Law. This provision among others relied upon by Ms Odtojan and Mr Bryl in their separate judicial review proceedings are not cited nor addressed in the judgment.
The judgment proceeds on the basis that in making renewal decisions under Chapter 3 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law, the Law Society has 'discretion' whether or not to invoke the disciplinary process in Chapter 5, notwithstanding that the matters relied upon consist of serious conduct allegations, "alleged prior misconduct", "misconduct," including alleged breaches of Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 5 and 32 arising from Supreme Court referrals. The reasoning does not explain how such conduct-based allegations may be relied upon to determine unfitness without engagement of the disciplinary framework contemplated by s 262 of the Uniform Law. This provision among others relied upon by Ms Odtojan and Mr Bryl in their separate judicial review proceedings are not cited nor addressed in the judgment.


By resolving conduct issues through Chapter 3, the judgment effectively displaces the mandatory Chapter 5 framework and its independent safeguards.


What does this mean?

It means a lawyer could face serious consequences affecting livelihood on the basis of untested allegations, without the safeguards of a Chapter 5 disciplinary process and without independent determination or oversight by NCAT.


In practical terms, NSW regulators (Law Society of NSW or the Legal Services Commissioner) may raise conduct concerns and resolve those issues relating to fitness administratively under Chapter 3, without those allegations without the disciplinary regime and without being tested in an independent tribunal.


For the full background, documentation, and chronology, see judicial review documents publicly accessible.

The judgment is published and publicly accessible.



Section 262 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law - Application of Chapter 5 to conduct of a lawyer or law practice.
Section 262 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law - Application of Chapter 5 to conduct of a lawyer or law practice.




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